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Abstract  This paper analyzes the microeconomic behavior of fishers respond-
ing to imperfectly enforced regulations through illegal fishing and efforts to
avoid detection. An intraseasonal optimization model is analyzed to determine
optimal (profit-maximizing) harvesting strategies at the individual fisher level
in response to input controls (such as gear or labor usage) or output controls
(individual harvest quotas). For each regulatory option, the analysis explores:
(a) the manner by which enforcement affects individual decisions concerning
fishing and avoidance activity, (b) the level of enforcement necessary to achieve
specified conservation goals, and (c) the role of various behavioral parameters
in determining fisher decisions. It is shown, in particular, that the nature of
avoidance behavior plays a crucial role in determining fisher response to regu-
lations. Broad implications of illegal behavior on the sustainability of fishery
systems are also discussed.
Key words  Behavioral models, effort control, fishery management, illegal fish-
ing, individual quotas, noncompliance.
Introduction
Illegal fishing has often played a major role in the failure of fishery regulations and
the consequent loss of long-term fishery benefits. This problem, and its roots in the
imperfect enforcement of fishery regulations, has been widely noted (e.g.,
Crutchfield 1979; Copes 1986), yet illegal behavior remains among the least studied
aspects of fisheries worldwide (Sutinen and Hennessey 1986). In particular, there
has been a lack of attention given, both in policy making and in fisheries economics,
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to the microeconomic behavior of fishers interacting with the regulatory environ-
ment (e.g., Wilen 1985; Anderson and Lee 1986; Anderson 1989). This paper fo-
cuses on that theme, examining illegal fishing as a behavioral response of self-inter-
ested fishers to imperfectly enforced regulations.
The limited literature available on the economic analysis of illegal fishing falls
into three groupings: theoretical, empirical, and policy oriented. The first of these
typically focuses on studies of optimal fishery enforcement at an industry or sectoral
level, with contributions including those of Andersen and Sutinen (1983), Sutinen and
Andersen (1985), Milliman (1986), Anderson and Lee (1986), Anderson (1987, 1989),
Neher (1990), and Sutinen (1993). A set of reviews on economic theory and modeling of
fishery enforcement is contained in Charles (1993), while the compilation of Sutinen
and Hennessey (1987) combines discussion of theory with policy aspects. Empirical
studies tend to deal with either behavioral responses of fishers to enforcement (e.g.,
Sutinen and Gauvin 1989; Furlong 1991; Kuperan and Sutinen 1998), or case stud-
ies of optimization at a sectoral level (Lepiz and Sutinen 1985; Sutinen 1988), using
operations research methods (cf. Armacost 1992; Crowley and Palsson 1992).
The basis of this literature lies in the general economics of crime and punish-
ment, in particular the seminal work of Becker (1968) and Stigler (1971), wherein
two fundamental results were established: (a) with costly enforcement, it will not be
optimal to ensure complete compliance; and (b) in such situations, one can expect
illegal activity to occur on the basis of marginal returns to individual decision mak-
ers responding to a set of regulations and enforcement levels. The latter point, com-
mon to most of the literature on illegal fishing, has important moral implications;
fisher decisions about whether to fish illegally are assumed to be based solely on
profit-maximizing (or utility-maximizing) criteria, with any penalties incurred for il-
legal fishing being perceived as simply a “cost of doing business.”
Within such a scenario, and given that illegal fishing often provides high returns
with typically low probabilities of detection and low resulting fines if caught
(Kuperan and Sutinen 1998), one would expect illegal activity to be widespread.
This does, indeed, seem to be the case in many fisheries. On the other hand, in many
other fisheries, the majority of fishers comply with regulations. In the latter case, it
seems that nonpecuniary factors, based on moral and social considerations, play a
major role in fisher decisions, a point recently established in an important empirical
study (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998; Sutinen and Kuperan 1999).
This paper maintains the Becker/Stigler perspective, modeling the
microeconomic behavior of profit-maximizing fishers in the face of regulatory re-
strictions, and in the absence of the above moral and social factors. This scenario is
crucial to understand, reflecting the fishery manager’s “worst case” scenario, in
which there is no inherent deterrence built into the socio-cultural fabric of the fish-
ery. It is also a realistic scenario, since, as Kuperan and Sutinen (1998) note, it is
typical for a group of fishers to contain a subgroup of “chronic, flagrant violators...
motivated only by the direct tangible consequences of their actions... [for whom]
moral obligation and social influence have little or no effect on their behavior.” This
subgroup of profit-maximizers may well account for the majority of violations, and
thus, as Kuperan and Sutinen (1998) argue, deserve emphasis in enforcement efforts.
This paper examines the response of fishers to regulations on inputs (e.g., gear
and labor) or on outputs (harvest), and specifically, how fisher behavior interacts
with enforcement activity by fishery management. The approach here differs from
that of most past studies, focusing on explicit behavioral modeling of fisher-level
decisions that underlie industry-level enforcement models (such as those referenced
above). Emphasis is placed on modeling not only illegal fishing activity per se, but
also the avoidance behavior of fishers seeking to evade detection and apprehension,
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This extends past efforts to examine avoidance behavior, and complements the em-
pirical approach of Kuperan and Sutinen (1998) on the topic.
The illegal fishing model is presented in the next section. Subsequent sections
describe the determination of optimality conditions and the generation of specific
results. The final section of the paper summarizes the results, and returns to the
theme addressed above, examining the implications of moral and social constraints,
or the lack thereof, on the sustainability of the fishery management system.
A Model of Fisher Behavior
In this section, a short-run, profit-maximization model is developed of fisher deci-
sion making within three regulatory environments: (i) unregulated, (ii) imperfectly
enforced input controls, and (iii) imperfectly enforced output controls. The focus is
on an intraseasonal analysis of a limited-entry fishery, in which the number of fish-
ers, N; the capital held by each fisher, K; and the initial fish biomass, B, are fixed
within a given fishing season. Emphasis is placed on the microeconomic behavior of
individual fishers; in most cases, specific values of variables and parameters are as-
sumed to apply to a particular fisher.
Two forms of the model are developed here: (i) a general formulation, using ge-
neric functional forms; and (ii) a linear-quadratic specification of the general case, ap-
plying particular assumptions about fishing, avoidance, and enforcement activities.
Fishing Inputs
We assume that each fisher can choose desired quantities of two possible configura-
tions (“input bundles”) of variable inputs—in other words, two available “blends” of
inputs such as labor, fuel, fishing gear, electronic gear, and fishing location. We assume
the two bundles differ in certain clearly specified ways. For example, one bundle
may consist of particular electronic gear, labor, and fuel, together with nets of a cer-
tain mesh size, while the other bundle could comprise the same electronic gear, la-
bor, and fuel, but with nets of a smaller mesh size. Decisions about fishing activity
are then made by choosing quantitative levels (x, x′ ) of the two input bundles.
This assumption facilitates analysis of illegal behavior in that, under input con-
trols, the second of the bundles is assumed to represent illegal fishing (use of an il-
legal input), so x′  is precisely the extent of illegal activity for the given fisher. (In
the above example, this may be the amount of time operating with illegal gear; i.e.,
nets with undersized mesh. Of course with pure output controls, both x and x′  are
legal input bundles.)
Regulatory Environment
The objective here is to study the fisher’s optimal behavior in response to given, but
imperfectly enforced, regulations. This behavior is reflected in the fisher’s choice of lev-
els of the fishing input bundles x and x′ , as well as another possible input, the level of
“avoidance” activity, A, that could be applied by the fisher seeking to avoid detection or
apprehension for illegal fishing. We examine three regulatory environments:
1. Unregulated.  If there is a complete absence of regulation (apart from limited en-
try restrictions), both inputs x and x′  are legal, and the fisher must then decide,
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2. Input Controls.  If a regulatory constraint is placed on inputs, we assume x and x′
are the amounts the fisher uses of the legal and illegal input bundles, respectively.
(The latter could involve an illegal mesh size, fishing in a closed area, etc.).
3. Output Controls.  As noted above, if the regulatory constraint is placed on output
(through catch quotas), harvesting can take place with any levels of x and x′ , but an
illegal harvest h′  = h – h  occurs if the catch (h) exceeds the fisher’s fixed allowable
quota (h ). We assume quotas are nontransferable, so it is likely that h′  ≥  0 (i.e., h ≥   h ),
but the analysis also holds if the catch is less than the quota (h < h ).1
Production Function
The fisher’s harvest level, h, is given by the short-run production function:
h = h(x, x′ , A; K, B) (1)
where x, x′ , and A are the levels of the variable inputs, K is the fisher’s capital stock
(vessel, gear, etc.), and B is the biomass of fish available. Typically, the harvest h
increases with x, x′ , K, and B, but hA ≤  0 since avoidance may decrease the time
available for fishing and the effectiveness of a unit of fishing input.
In the linear-quadratic specification, it is assumed further that production is: (i)
linear and separable in the two input bundles x and x′ , (ii) proportional to stock biomass
B, and (iii) unaffected by the capital stock, K, or the avoidance activity, A. The latter,
which is assumed for ease of analysis, means that any detrimental impact of avoidance
on production is assumed to be captured in the cost function rather than entering into
the production function directly (i.e., hA = 0). Then, the nominal harvests produced
from inputs x and x′  are qxB and q′ x′ B, respectively (with q and q′  constant
catchability coefficients), and the individual fisher’s production function becomes:
h = qxB + q′ x′ B (2)
Fishing Costs
It is assumed that the total variable cost is given by the sum of cost functions for
each input (x, x′ , and A):
Total Variable Costs = c(x) + c′ (x′ ) + cA(A) (3)
In the linear-quadratic specification, cost functions are assumed to be quadratic, re-
flecting increasing marginal costs arising due to the aggregation of inputs in
“bundles” as well as the common occurrence in fisheries of constrained access to
factor markets and inflexible labor markets (due perhaps to contracting or share sys-
tems). Specifically, the overall cost function is given by:2
Total Variable Costs = cx2 + c′ x′ 2 + cAA2 (4)
1 Optimal quota allocation, the subject of an extensive literature, is not addressed here so as to better focus on
operational matters of how a given set of input or output regulations interacts with fisher behavior.
2 Note that this specification differs from the commonly assumed cubic total variable cost function (and
corresponding U-shaped marginal and average cost curves). The single-term form of the quadratic func-
tion used here also restricts the total variable cost to the rising portion of a U-shaped curve, implying a
linearly increasing marginal cost and avoiding the need to deal with a range of inputs over which total
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Penalties for Illegal Fishing
Following Sutinen and Andersen (1985) and Becker (1968), it is assumed that under
regulation, the fisher has the option of fishing illegally, but faces a probability θ  of
being caught and convicted if doing so. This probability is assumed to increase with
the levels of enforcement and of illegal fishing, but to decrease with avoidance ac-
tivity. Defining EI and Eo as the levels of enforcement in place under a system of
input controls or output controls, respectively, the probability that the fisher will be
caught and convicted for fishing illegally is as follows:
θ  = θ (x′ , EI, A) with ∂θ /∂ x′  ≥  0, ∂θ /∂ E > 0, ∂θ /∂ A < 0; θ  ≡  0 if x′  = 0 (5a)
θ  = θ (h′ , Eo, A) with ∂θ /∂ h′  ≥  0, ∂θ /∂ E > 0, ∂θ /∂ A < 0; θ  ≡  0 if h ≤   h (5b)
for the cases of input and output controls, respectively.
It is assumed that, if caught and convicted, the fisher is assessed a fine, which
may be constant or may rise with the level of illegal activity. In the latter case, to avoid
dealing with an unrealistically large fine, it is assumed that the fine does not exceed the
fisher’s assets, proxied here by the capital stock, K. [This contrasts with a theoretically
“ideal” enforcement policy that equates the fine’s expected value to the social opportu-
nity cost of illegal behavior at the margin; see Becker (1968) and Posner (1977)].
The resulting fines for input and output controls, respectively, are then given by:
F = F(x′ ; K) with ∂ F/∂ x′  ≥  0; F ≡  0 if x′  = 0 (6a)
F = F(h′ ; K) with ∂ F/∂ h′  ≥  0; F ≡  0 if h ≤   h (6b)
The expected value of the fine is given by the product of the probability and the fine
itself, namely θ F.
For the linear-quadratic case, this general structure will be considerably simpli-
fied through three substantial assumptions: (i) in the absence of avoidance, the prob-
ability of detection and conviction resulting from a given level of illegal fishing is
jointly proportional to the enforcement effort, EI or Eo, and the level of illegal fish-
ing, x′  or h′ ; (ii) avoidance activity, A, reduces the above probability by a factor
(1 – γ A) where γ  is a constant; and (iii) the resulting fine on conviction is constant,
independent of the extent of illegal activity. (This clearly restrictive assumption,
which is applied only to the linear-quadratic case, is adopted primarily to maintain a
quadratic model structure, although it is also compatible with the use in some juris-
dictions of a “zero tolerance” approach to enforcement.)
With these assumptions, and after suitably scaling the variables, the expected























where proportionality constants are set to unity, so enforcement efforts EI and Eo can
also be viewed as expected fines per unit of illegal activity, in the absence of avoid-
ance activity (A = 0).Charles, Mazany, and Cross 100
Fisher Optimization
Each year, the fisher must choose a fishing strategy based on desired levels of the
inputs x, x′ , and A. If faced with moral or social constraints, there may be a nonpe-
cuniary aversion to illegal behavior, and thus the very decision to engage in such be-
havior (i.e., to choose a nonzero value of x′  or h′ ) may need to be considered sepa-
rately (as in the approach of Sutinen 1993; Kuperan and Sutinen 1998). In the
present case, however, the fisher is assumed to treat illegal inputs no differently
from legal inputs; the goal of the fisher is simply to choose input levels x, x′ , and A
to maximize short-run restricted profits. (Note that this assumes risk-neutrality, and
an absence of rent-seeking behavior—costs are not incurred specifically in an effort
to have the regulations changed.)
Given the above schedule of probabilities and fines, the single-year optimiza-
tion problem for the fisher is given by:
max
,, xx A ′
 [ph(x, x′ , A; K, B) – c(x) – c′ (x′ ) – cA(A) – θ F] (8)
where x and x′  are the amounts of the two input bundles, and p is the unit price of
output (assumed parametric to the fisher). Note that inherent in expression (8) is the
choice of whether or not to engage in illegal behavior: a value x′  = 0 (in the case of
input control) or a combination of x and x′  giving h′  = 0 (in the case of output con-
trol) are valid solutions of this decision problem. On the other hand, if the fisher
does undertake illegal fishing, the expected fine for illegal fishing (θ F) and the cost
of avoidance, cA(A), are additional costs that may be incurred.
In the linear-quadratic specification, the fisher’s annual decision problem for in-
put or output controls, respectively, is:
max
,, xx A ′
 [pqBx + pq′ Bx′  – cx2 – c′ x′ 2 – cAA2 – (1 – γ A)EIx′ ] (9a)
max
,, xx A ′
 [pqBx + pq′ Bx′  – cx2 – c′ x′ 2 – cAA2 – (1 – γ A)Eoh′ ] (9b)
Note that these expressions differ only in the variables denoting illegal activity
(x′  vs. h′ ) and enforcement effort (EI vs. Eo).
Profit-Maximizing Decision Making
This section derives expressions for optimal fisher behavior for each of the general
and linear-quadratic forms of the model, and for each of the three regulatory op-
tions: (i) no regulation, (ii) input controls, and (iii) output controls.
Fisher Behavior With No Regulation
In the absence of regulation, there is a zero probability of incurring penalties for il-
legal fishing (θ F = 0), and no need for avoidance, so A = 0 and cA(A) = 0 in the opti-
mization expression (8). Assuming an interior solution of equation (8), with positive
values of x and x′ , the first-order conditions equate value of the marginal product
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phx = cx(x) (10a)
phx′ = c′ x′  (x′ ) (10b)
where, in this case and other analyses of the general model as specified below, sub-
scripts denote partial derivatives. In the linear-quadratic case, equations (10a) and
(10b) become:
pqB = 2cx (11a)
pq′ B = 2c′ x′ (11b)
Fisher Behavior Under Input Regulations
Here, illegal behavior arises through use of the input x′  (versus the legal x) subject
to some probability of being caught and convicted if so engaged. Assuming, as
above, that θ  and F are functions of x′ , and again letting subscripts indicate partial
derivatives, the first-order conditions are as follows:
ph c x xx ≤ () with equality if x > 0 (12a)
ph F F c x xx xx ′′ ′′
′ +≤ ′ –( ) ( ) θθ with equality if x′  > 0 (12b)
−= − θ AA
A
A Fc A p h () (12c)
where the inequalities are technical requirements to allow for the possibility of a
zero input, whether legal (x = 0) or illegal (x′  = 0).
Note that from equation (12a), the optimal level of the legal input, x, is deter-
mined as in the case of no regulation [see equation (10a)]. In contrast, the optimal
illegal input, x′ , is determined from equation (12b) by equating its marginal value to
the sum of the marginal factor cost and the marginal expected fine. Finally, in equa-
tion (12c), the optimal level of avoidance is determined by equating the marginal
benefit of avoidance in reducing the expected fine (–θ AF) to the marginal cost of
avoidance  cA A
A() , plus an indirect marginal cost, the lost harvest revenue due to
fishing suboptimally (–phA).
For the linear-quadratic specification (assuming an interior solution with posi-
tive values of x, x′ , and A), equation (12) becomes:
pqB = 2cx (13a)
pq′ B – (1 – γ A)EI  = 2c′ x′ (13b)
γ EIx′  = 2cAA (13c)
The left-hand sides of equations (13a) and (13b) are the values of the marginal
revenue product with respect to x and x′ . For the illegal input x′ , this is net of the
expected fine due to illegal fishing, which increases with enforcement, EI, and de-
creases with avoidance, A. The marginal gain and cost of avoidance are equated in
equation (13c) to give A = (γ /2cA)EIx′ , which is jointly proportional to the levels ofCharles, Mazany, and Cross 102
illegal input (x′ ) and of enforcement effort (EI). Note that for any given x′  and EI,
avoidance increases with its effectiveness (γ ) and decreases with its cost (cA).
Solving the equations in (13) simultaneously gives the optimal fishing and
avoidance inputs:































These expressions are valid given an interior maximum, which occurs if three
conditions are satisfied. First, the denominator in equations (14b) and (14c) needs to
be positive; this is a mathematical requirement for an interior maximum derived by
treating equation (9a) as a function of x′  and A. Second, given this, the numerator in
equations (14b) and (14c) should also be positive, to ensure positive inputs. Finally,
the solution of equation (14c) needs to satisfy the logical model requirement
that 1 – γ A > 0. These conditions for an interior maximum can be written:
Ec c I
A <′ () 4 21 2 γ (15a)
Ep q B I <′ (15b)
Ec c p q B I
A <′ ′ () ( ) . γ 2 4 (15c)
The analysis below focuses on interior solutions, as in equation (14), for which
conditions in equation (15) hold. Note that from equation (15), illegal fishing will
occur (x′  > 0) only if enforcement effort is not so high as to remove the incentive to do
so. Furthermore, note that the parameter (cA/γ 2) plays a major role; illegal activity can
occur even at high enforcement levels, if avoidance is expensive (high cA) and/or
relatively ineffective (low γ 2). This parameter is examined further at a later point.
Fisher Behavior Under Output Regulations
When output, rather than input, is regulated, the fisher’s optimization problem re-
mains as in equation (8), except that now both input bundles are legal, and illegal
fishing occurs when the fisher’s total catch exceeds the (predetermined) individual
catch quota, h . The profit-maximizing, first-order conditions (with subscripts indi-
cating partial derivatives) are:
pF F h c x hh xx −+ [] ≤ ′′ () ( ) θθ  with equality if h′  > 0 (16a)
pF F h c x hh x x −+ [] ≤′ ′′ ′ ′ () ( ) θθ  with equality if h′  > 0 (16b)
−= − θ AA
A
A Fc A p h () (16c)Economics of Illegal Fishing: A Behavioral Model 103
Expressions (16a) and (16b) are similar to their counterparts in the absence
of regulation [equations (10a) and (10b)], except that for harvesting beyond the
legal quota, fisher decisions are based on an effective price given by the actual
price, p, minus the marginal expected fine (marginal with respect to the illegal
harvest h′ ).
With the linear-quadratic form, equations (16a), (16b), and (16c) for opti-
mal inputs x, x′ , and A under harvest controls (assuming an interior solution
with h′  = h – h  > 0 and positive input levels) become:
pA E q B c x o −− [] = () 12 γ (17a)
pA E q B c x o −− [] ′= ′ ′ () 12 γ (17b)
γ E qxB q x B h c A o
A () +′ ′− = 2 (17c)
Here the optimality conditions for x and x′  are symmetric, differing only due to
differences in catchabilities (q versus q′ ) and input costs (c versus c′ ). Note also that
the left-hand side of equation (17c), the marginal benefit of avoidance, can be writ-
ten γ Eoh′  so the optimal avoidance effort is A = (γ /2cA)Eoh′ . As for input controls, the
latter is jointly proportional to the illegal activity (now h′ ) and enforcement effort
(Eo). Furthermore, for given levels of these variables, the desired avoidance in-
creases with its effectiveness (γ ) and decreases with its cost (cA).
Now, to solve equations (17a), (17b), and (17c), it is convenient to first ex-
amine harvests in the absence of enforcement. Setting Eo = 0 in equations (17a)
and (17b) provides the optimal inputs x and x′  in such a case. Substituting these
in equation (2) gives the fisher’s desired total harvest given zero enforcement:
hM = (pq2B2/2c) + (pq′ 2B2/2c′ ). (For later use, we designate the first term here as
hL and the second as hI; under input controls, these are the maximum legal and
illegal harvests, respectively.) Then the solution to the three equations in (17)
































































These equations for x, x′ , and A are valid given an interior solution. This re-
quires logically that A > 0 and h′  > 0, but since h′  and A are proportional from
equation (17c), it is sufficient to show that A > 0, which, in turn, requires the
numerator and denominator in equation (18c) be positive. It is also necessary
that 1 – γ A > 0 by assumption in the model. Thus, an interior solution will be
obtained if:Charles, Mazany, and Cross 104
Ep hh h oMM <− () (19a)
Ec p h o
A
M < () 2 21 2 γ (19b)
Ech h o
A
M <− 2 2 () ( ) . γ (19c)
As with input controls, these conditions imply that illegal fishing will occur
(x′  > 0) only if enforcement effort does not totally remove the incentive to do so.
Again, the parameter (cA/γ 2) is important here, with the relationship between illegal
activity and enforcement dependent on the cost and effectiveness of avoidance. Note
that in the following, model parameters are assumed to be such that an interior solu-
tion does indeed occur.
Analysis
Two fundamental themes are analyzed in this section: (i) the nature of interactions
between enforcement and fisher response, with implications for the effectiveness of
input and output controls; and (ii) the determination of enforcement levels required
to achieve specified conservation targets (harvest levels) under each form of regula-
tory control.
Impacts of Enforcement
Enforcement (EI and Eo) acts through the regulatory environment of detection (θ )
and fines (F) to affect fishing and avoidance activities (x, x′ , and A). These impacts
are determined implicitly through the first-order conditions in equations (12), (13),
(16), and (17), and explicitly through the results in equations (14) and (18). The fol-
lowing focuses on the case of most interest, in which a positive level of illegal fish-
ing is profitable from the fisher’s perspective, making all first-order conditions into
equations.
As noted earlier, in the absence of enforcement (E = 0), there is no risk that vio-
lations will be detected (θ  = 0), so fishers will choose not to engage in avoidance
activity (A = 0). Under such conditions, all sets of first-order conditions collapse to
the optimality criteria that apply in the absence of regulation. In other words, what-
ever the set of regulations, there is absolutely no effect on fisher behavior if those
regulations are not enforced (assuming an absence of moral considerations).
With a positive level of enforcement, on the other hand, the fisher’s response to
enforcement varies with the form of controls in place. Furthermore, examination of
results in the previous section indicates that the nature of this difference cannot be
deduced in a clear-cut manner in the general case or the specific linear-quadratic
model. Not only do optimality conditions differ structurally between regulatory op-
tions, more fundamentally so do the units of measurement, both with respect to fish-
ing variables (x, x′ , vs. h′ ) and enforcement variables (EI vs. Eo).3
3 Indeed, even for a single form of regulation, parameters such as detection probabilities and the effec-
tiveness of avoidance will vary across the many possible regulatory violations. For example, a fisher
might violate output controls by dumping or highgrading (to improve the mix of species or sizes in the
catch) or by landing fish in excess of the allowable quota. The former, occurring at sea, is likely much
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These factors suggest that, within a theoretical analysis, one cannot draw gen-
eral conclusions about the relative merits of input or output controls as regulatory
tools. Ultimately, comparison of these options must be done empirically, possibly
based on models such as those presented here.4
It is possible, however, to compare qualitatively the impacts of enforcement on
illegal fishing. Our analysis indicates that such impacts depend strongly on the na-
ture of avoidance activity; specifically, its cost and effectiveness. “Regular” interac-
tion of enforcement with fisher behavior occurs if avoidance is neither too cheap nor
too effective, satisfying the following conditions:
Input controls: (cA/γ 2) > (pq′ B)2/4c′ (20a)
Output controls: (cA/γ 2) > p(hM – h )2/2hM (20b)
Given these conditions, with input controls, the illegal input, x′ , decreases
steadily with the level of enforcement, EI (while the optimal level of the legal input,
x, is independent of enforcement and avoidance). Similarly, with output controls
(and assuming the presence of illegal harvests, h > h ), both inputs x and x′  decrease
steadily with the level of enforcement, Eo.
These results imply, first, that for “regular” avoidance parameters, the fishery man-
ager can reduce illegal fishing toward zero by increasing enforcement toward the upper
limits EI = pq′ B under input controls, or Eo = p(hM – h )/hM under output controls. Sec-
ond, at low levels of enforcement, fishers will respond to increases in enforcement by
increasing avoidance activity, but at higher enforcement levels, it becomes uneconomi-
cal to continue to do so, at which point avoidance actually decreases with enforcement.
On the other hand, if the above conditions on avoidance do not hold, so that
avoidance is very inexpensive and/or very efficient, then the fisher response to en-
forcement will be different. The optimal level of avoidance will then increase indefi-
nitely with increasing enforcement; the fishers react to enforcement not necessarily
by reducing illegal behavior, but more so by attempting to avoid apprehension. This
very different response highlights the importance of understanding avoidance behav-
ior, since changes in key avoidance parameters can have a major impact on the ef-
fects of enforcement activities.
Enforcement Requirements to Achieve Conservation
Suppose that, for conservation reasons, fishery management seeks to set a suitable
enforcement level to limit the aggregate harvest to a certain total allowable catch
(TAC). The realized aggregate harvest is given by the sum across the N fishers of all
individual harvests, h. The latter are obtained for the case of input controls by in-
serting expressions for x and x′  from equation (14) into the production function h =
qBx + q′ Bx′ , and for output controls by combining equations (17c) and (18c):
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4 The option also exists to combine the use of input and output controls within a single regulatory re-
gime. This is not uncommon in practice, although one or the other tends to dominate. Conservation im-
plications of fully combining the two regulatory approaches were examined recently by Canada’s Fish-
eries Resource Conservation Council (1996). Economic aspects could be examined through a modified
version of the model in this paper.Charles, Mazany, and Cross 106
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with hL = pq2B2/2c and hM = hL + hI (with hI = pq′ 2B2/2c′ ) as above.
In general, these individual harvests will vary among fishers, but suppose, for
simplicity, that all N fishers are identical. Then, to keep within the overall TAC, the
manager should maintain the actual per-capita harvest at a level h* = TAC/N.5
Note that under input controls, each fisher will catch at least hL, the harvest aris-
ing from use of the legal input, but will not wish to catch more than hM, the “unregu-
lated” total harvest. Thus, the range of values of h* that can be feasibly considered is
hL < h* < hM.
With output controls, the situation is more complicated due to interactions be-
tween the per-capita catch, h*, that the manager wishes to achieve, and what the
manager declares to be the fisher’s allowable quota, h . In the absence of illegal
fishing, the manager would simply set the latter equal to the former (h  = h*). How-
ever, with illegal activity as an available option, the actual catch is likely to exceed
the legal quota, h . Thus, to avoid overharvesting, the manager must set the legal
quota below the acceptable catch; i.e.,  h  ≤  h*. Here it is assumed that this is the
case, so under output controls, the feasible range of values of h* is h  ≤  h* ≤  hM (as-
suming h  is at least hL).6
Equating expressions (21) for the actual per-capita harvest, h, to the desired
level, h*, and rearranging, we obtain quadratic expressions for the enforcement ef-
fort required to achieve the desired conservation target under each form of control:
Input:  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ** γ 22 22 0 ch h E q B E c h h A
LI I M −− ′ + ′ − = (22a)
Output:   () () ( ) . ** γ 22 20 ch h E E p h hh A
oo M M −− +− = (22b)
It can be shown that, for any level of the target catch, h*, that is feasible (as de-
fined above), a solution to each equation exists, as long as avoidance is “regular” in
that the conditions in equations (20a) or (20b) hold. In such cases, for any feasible
h*, there will be two positive solutions for the required enforcement effort, but only
the lower of the two satisfies the conditions on enforcement in equations (15) and
(19). Using this solution, the required enforcement effort under input and output
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5 Since earlier results were based on assuming a positive level of illegal activity, the additional assump-
tion of identical fishers implies that everyone is fishing illegally. In the present context, this should not
be taken literally (in which case every fisher could immediately be apprehended), but rather as exacer-
bating the “worst-case” nature of the analysis. Nevertheless, in practice, the proportion of fishers fishing
illegally is an important matter. For example, at a set level of enforcement, the greater this proportion,
the greater the probability that a monitored fisher is engaged in illegal activity, but the lower the prob-
ability that a given fisher is among those monitored (a point similar to the rationale for why fish move
in schools). However, such matters are beyond the scope of this paper.
6 As noted above, this could have moral implications, particularly in legitimizing the existence of illegal
harvesting, which, in turn, could affect the long-run sustainability of the regulatory system. This is dis-
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Analysis of these expressions shows that required levels of enforcement under
both forms of regulation (EI and Eo) decrease with increases in the TAC quota (and,
thus the individual harvest, h*, targeted by the manager). Specifically, the required
level of enforcement decreases from high levels (necessary when the harvest is to be
kept close to minimal levels, hL or  h ) toward zero (as harvest is allowed to rise toward
its unregulated level hM). This intuitive result, derived from the present fisher-level be-
havioral model, is in keeping with the assumed form of enforcement costs used in a
fishery-level optimization context (Sutinen and Andersen 1985; Sutinen 1993).
Furthermore, it may be noted that, assuming x′  > 0, both EI and Eo decrease as
avoidance becomes more expensive and/or less efficient. To summarize, less fishery
enforcement is required if: (i) fishers have less incentive to overfish (high h*),
and/or (ii) fishers have less incentive to avoid fishery enforcement measures (high
cA or low γ 2).7
Discussion
This paper has focused on microeconomic decision making of individual fishers
with the option to fish illegally within an environment of imperfect regulatory en-
forcement. A unified model was developed, analyzing illegal fishing behavior under
either input or output regulations. The model emphasizes the fisher’s intraseasonal
decision problem, since, in practice, it is within this timeframe that decisions about
illegal fishing are made.
The model could be applied to specific case studies, given suitable empirical
data. However, as a theoretical model, its principal benefit lies in the insights pro-
vided into interactions between fishing, enforcement, and avoidance.
Summary
Under the assumption of simple, profit-maximizing behavior, the present analysis is
compatible with past studies, indicating how illegal fishing (exceeding quotas or us-
ing illegal gear) can occur if the marginal value of the catch, net of the expected
marginal fine, exceeds the marginal factor cost. Analysis of the model has produced
a number of results, summarized below:
1. The choice between input and output controls in fishery management is an em-
pirical matter, since, from a theoretical perspective, universal conclusions cannot
be drawn about the relative merits of the two forms of management.
2. Illegal fishing will occur (x′  > 0 or h′  > 0) only if enforcement effort is not so
high as to remove the incentive to do so, and if the effectiveness of avoidance is
not too great, nor its cost too low. Avoidance effort will occur at a level jointly
7 It should be noted that if avoidance is either very inexpensive or very efficient, so the conditions in
expressions (20a) and (20b) do not hold, then there will be some otherwise-feasible h* values that cannot
be achieved, regardless of the enforcement level. This limitation on the capabilities of enforcement
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proportional to the extent of illegal activity and of enforcement; for given levels
of the latter, the desired avoidance effort increases with its effectiveness (γ ) and
decreases with its cost (cA).
3. Understanding avoidance behavior appears to be crucial to any efforts to improve
fishery enforcement. How enforcement and fisher behavior interact depends
strongly on characteristics of avoidance, specifically its cost and effectiveness.
When avoidance is neither too cheap nor too effective, the interaction is regular.
In this case, at low levels of enforcement, fishers respond to increases in enforce-
ment by increasing avoidance, but at higher enforcement levels, it becomes un-
economical to continue to do so, and avoidance decreases with enforcement.
Overall, illegal activity decreases steadily with enforcement, so the fishery man-
ager is able, in theory, to reduce illegal fishing toward zero by increasing enforce-
ment. If, however, avoidance is very inexpensive and/or very efficient, then the
optimal level of avoidance will increase indefinitely with increasing enforcement;
fishers react to enforcement not so much by reducing illegal behavior as by focus-
ing on avoiding apprehension.
4. Less fishery enforcement is required if fishers have less incentive to overfish (be-
cause the TAC is large), and/or fishers have less incentive to avoid fishery en-
forcement measures (since avoidance is costly or inefficient).
Intertemporal Aspects
This model also can be used as a module within intertemporal models of optimal
fishery enforcement. Such models (e.g., Sutinen and Andersen 1985, Sutinen 1993)
involve the choice of decision rules for setting enforcement effort {Et} and a set of
input or output controls to maximize the discounted present value of a stream of net
benefits given specified fish population dynamics. This model permits the calcula-
tion of total annual net benefits from the fishery in each year, t, for a given enforce-
ment effort, Et, and regulatory package of input or output controls, by first predict-
ing fisher response in terms of input levels x, x′ , and A, and then aggregating over
all fishers. Thus, this microeconomic analysis of illegal fishing behavior leads not
only to a better understanding of fisher response to regulations, but also to a mecha-
nism for basing industry-level analysis of optimal enforcement on detailed
microeconomic response functions.
Moral and Social Aspects
As noted previously, a crucial underlying issue in addressing illegal fishing behavior
lies in the determinants of that behavior; in particular, the presence or absence of
moral and social considerations. This paper focused on exploring a worst-case sce-
nario of amoral profit maximizing by fishers, in which decisions about fishing ille-
gally are made merely by balancing expected revenues and costs, and possible pen-
alties for illegal fishing are simply “costs of doing business.” This situation has im-
plications for sustainability of the fishery management system.
In such a case, the manager is faced with the dilemma discussed earlier. Sup-
pose the manager simply sets the allowable quota or effort at what has been deter-
mined as the desired level (h  = h*). If there were no illegal fishing, this action
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allowable levels will be exceeded, and over harvesting will occur—as has been ob-
served in the past.
The alternative is to set the declared allowable catch or effort at a suitably re-
duced level (h  < h*). This would keep actual harvests, including illegal catches,
within desired limits. There is, however, a risk involved, namely that illegal behav-
ior could be institutionalized, or be perceived to be legitimized.
Suppose the management agency systematically reduces the TAC to account for
estimated illegal catches. On the one hand, this creates an incentive to report viola-
tors; by reducing illegal fishing, the legal TAC can be increased. However, this prac-
tice also penalizes law-abiding fishers—their catch is reduced—while violators ob-
tain not only a share of the reduced TAC, but also an illegal catch. An incentive is
created to join the violators, fueled perhaps by a sense that the management agency
is willing to accept illegal fishing, having incorporated it into the decision-making
process. In either case, there may be a loss of faith in the management process, lead-
ing to increased illegal fishing.
Whether or not the institutional dilemma inherent in this “worst-case” scenario
needs to be taken into account is very much an empirical matter. It may be important
to contrast fisheries where illegal activity is so widespread as to be considered the
norm, with those where such behavior is almost universally rejected as antisocial—
where breaking the law is not acceptable practice. In between there are many inter-
mediate cases in which the majority of fishers comply with regulations, while some
do not.
Situations in which moral and social factors play a role in limiting illegal fish-
ing can be partially addressed using the present model, by incorporating into the
fisher’s optimization function a cost of illegal fishing in addition to the expected
fine, to reflect the intrinsic moral disbenefit of such activity. Alternatively, this can
be dealt with more explicitly; Kuperan and Sutinen (1998) and Sutinen and Kuperan
(1999) extend the traditional enforcement model to incorporate moral and social
variables, as well as economic ones, into the fisher’s decision problem. Application
of this extended model to a specific fishery produced empirical evidence showing
the extent to which moral and social considerations (e.g., relating to the perceived
legitimacy of regulations) impact the decision making of fishers.
Clearly, there remains much scope for further research on illegal fishing behav-
ior and fishery enforcement. In particular, the analysis in this paper points to the
specific need for more extensive studies of avoidance behavior by fishers, since in
the scenario addressed here, such behavior can play a major role in determining the
impact of enforcement effort.
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